

# Digitalisierung und Arbeitsmärkte im Wettbewerb der Systeme

JENS SUEDEKUM


HEINRICH-HEINE-UNIVERSITÄT DÜSSELDORF

VERKEHRSÖKONOMIK UND -POLITIK – 23.5.2019



# „Robots are taking our jobs“

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


*For, if each tool could perform its task on command or by anticipating instructions, and if like the statues of Daedalus or the tripods of Hephaestus . . . shuttles wove cloth by themselves, and picks played the lyre, a **master craftsman would not need assistants**, and **masters would not need slaves**. (Politika I.4, 1253b33–1254a8)*

**Aristotle** (384 – 322 b.c.) on “**artificial intelligence**”

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
**Aristotle** (384 – 322 b.c.) on “**artificial intelligence**”

Two ways to read this quote

- Unskilled workers become redundant, assistants are displaced
- Skilled labor (“masters”) become infinitely productive

# The productivity paradox

Percentage change in median TFP growth (5 year moving average)



Source: Penn World Tables database.

- **Thesis**


Massive productivity growth with digitalization

- **Antithesis**

Productivity slowdown in advanced economies

- Similar trends across countries, incl. EU
- Only partly accounted for by mis-measurement

# Future productivity growth: Two hypotheses




## Optimistic view (Thesis): It's coming!

- We're at the beginning of an exponential path!
- By 2066, *all* human tasks performed by machines


## Pessimistic view (Antithesis): Secular stagnation

- Claims about digitalization vastly overblown
- Not as fundamental as electricity, light bulbs, ... (Robert Gordon)

# Dialectic view: Synthesis



Source: Haldane (2017)



Notes: Frontier defined as top 5% of firms by GVA per worker in a given year and sector as defined by 2-digit SIC 2007

Secular stagnation among **normal firms**, massive productivity growth among **superstars**


The “**superstar phenomenon**”: Rising dispersion of productivity & concentration of market power in top firms



I. WHAT HAPPENED SO FAR?  
SOME GOOD AND SOME BAD NEWS


II. WHAT MAY HAPPEN TOMORROW?

III. WHAT SHOULD WE DO ABOUT IT?






# Industrial robots in Europe






# Labor market effects in Germany: No job losses!





- Gross impact 1994-2014:  
Loss of 280.000 manufacturing jobs (~2 per robot)
- No disruptive displacements: Workers moved to different tasks & occupations at the same workplace
- Fewer new manufacturing jobs for labor market entrants
- They started their career directly in (business) services
- Net impact of robots on the number of jobs: **0**

# Bad news: Falling labour share, more wage inequality



- Strong increase in average labour productivity, but not average wages
- High-skilled workers gain, real wage losses in the middle of the wage distribution
- Decreasing labour share of income, rents go to capital and firm owners

# Robots and firm-level profit margins




- Productivity & markup estimation for 6 European countries: Rising average markups in most industries
- Markups strongly rise at the top, not at the bottom of the firm-level distribution
- Trend is stronger in more robotized industries: Robots drive “superstar phenomenon” in European manufacturing

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
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# The next wave: AI, machine learning, and all that

Technologies by proportion of companies likely to adopt them by 2022 (projected)




Source: Future of Jobs Survey 2018, World Economic Forum.

- WEF „*Future of Jobs*“ report:  
Survey of 313 global firms with 15m employees
- Vast majority will adopt/expand big data analytics, machine learning, autonomous transport, ...
- A problem for accountants, clerks, truck drivers,...
- Maybe also for radiologists, musicians, .... ?
- Overall projection:
  - 75 Mio. displaced jobs
  - + 133 Mio. new jobs



# Implications for the labour market



*“In summary, while overall job losses are predicted to be offset by job gains, there will be a significant shift in the quality, location, format and permanency of new roles.”*


- At risk: Data entry clerks, secretaries, assembly workers, ...
- In demand: Data analysts, IT specialists, ... customer services, „people and culture specialists“
- Warning sign with a consistent message:  
Mass unemployment not the major problem,  
but job polarization and labor market mismatch

# Why is labor not becoming redundant?

Abb.: Voraussichtliche Entwicklung des Erwerbspersonenpotenzials in Deutschland, 2000 bis 2060

Erwerbspotenzial in Millionen

Quelle: IAB-Forschungsbericht 10/2016




1. Algorithms & robots displace **task**, not entire **jobs**
2. New tasks, new jobs!  
  
“Interface designers” unknown even in 2013
3. New technologies → lower costs → lower prices  
→ higher product demand → higher labour demand  
  
(esp. in top firms adopting the latest technologies)
4. Main opponent in many European countries:  
**DEMOGRAPHY!**

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# Key policy challenges

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## **1. Mismatch in the labour market**

Co-existence of displacements and labour shortages, structural changes in the labour market

## **2. Rising concentration of market power & profits in superstar firms**


Low productivity growth, especially in “normal” (non-frontier) firms

## **3. Distributional consequences of digitalization**

Falling labour share of income, rising capital & profit earnings, polarization of job qualities

# Challenge 1 : Mismatch in the labour market


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- Life-long learning, on-the-job worker training of *general* skills
- Key question: Who pays for it?
- Learning in schools should facilitate later occupational mobility
- German apprenticeship system a role model  
Reason why it digested the “robot shock” better than the US
- Further aspect: new jobs more flexible and mobile  
→ New arrangements for the organization of work



## Challenge 2 : Concentration in superstar firms



- New technologies not harmful in those firms that adopt, but in those that *don't* adopt them
- Similar principle for national labour markets: fewer worries for countries at the technological frontier
- Case for urgency: Productivity growth in Europe
- Shifting out the knowledge frontier in top firms  
Innovation policy and basic research, top universities in Europe
- Diffusion of knowledge from “superstars” to “normal firms”  
Structural and regional policies, solid colleges in the periphery

# Challenge 3: Bad answers to distributional consequences

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Robots taxes




Universal basic income



# Better answer: Disperse asset ownership & profit earnings

## Shares of household income and wealth held by units in the top 10% of the distribution

2014 or latest available year



Source: OECD Wealth Distribution Database, <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=WEALTH>, and OECD Income Distribution Database, <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=IDD>.

- Rising profit share of income + strong concentration of asset ownership → rising wealth & earnings inequality
- Encourage asset ownership: employee stock options, profit sharing arrangements
- But bottom 50% hardly save : Sovereign wealth funds (?)



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**THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION!**

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