

# What Impacts the Productivity of Indian Seaports?

Konferenz „Verkehrsökonomik und –politik“, Berlin, 23. und 24. Mai 2019

Shravana Kumar

Hochschule Bremen City University of Applied Sciences and TU Dresden

Prof. Dr. Nicole Adler

Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Prof. Dr. Georg Hirte

TU Dresden

Prof. Dr. Hans-Martin Niemeier

Hochschule Bremen City University of Applied Sciences

# Motivation

- Seaport reform vital for developing countries in trade integration
- Value added in seaport clusters (de Langen; 2004; p.201):
  - Logistics
  - Manufacturing
  - Trade Activities
- Seaports that perform well add higher value to the surrounding regions
- Seaport performance could be impacted by external factors

# Agenda

- Measuring relative performance of Indian central seaports for the time period 1995-96 to 2015-16 (21 years, 11 seaports) with DEA
- Impacts of external factors on performance with a seaports fixed effects regression
  - An economic measure of specialization (Keeble and Hauser HHI) (Keeble and Hauser, 1971)
  - External stakeholder participation
  - Competition between state and central ports at the level of the state, along the coast and from the opposite coast
  - Tariff regulation from a partly independent regulator (Tariff Authority for Major Ports (TAMP))

# Previous Research – Impacts of External Factors on Seaport Performance

- Specialization

- Spanish port authority efficiency positively correlated with complexity of port operations (Martinez-Budria et al., 1999)

- Ownership

- No significant impact of public or private ownership on technical efficiency of container ports (Cullinane et al., 2005a)
  - Ownership restructuring contributes to total factor productivity gains of container ports (Cheon et al., 2010)
  - Public-private partnerships enhance technical efficiency of Brazilian seaports (Wanke and Barros, 2015) and Chinese container ports (Yuen et al., 2013)

# Previous Research – Impacts of External Factors on Seaport Performance

- Competition

- Intra- and inter-port competition has positive technical efficiency impacts on Chinese container ports (Yuen et al., 2013)
- Inter-port competition has negative impacts on the efficiency growth of Chinese container ports (ibid.)
- Increasing regional inter-port competition has negative impacts on technical efficiency of container ports (Oliviera and Cariou, 2015)
- Increasing regional inter-port competition has positive impacts on technical efficiency of European container ports (Merkel, 2018)

- Regulation

- Proposal of DEA as an incentive regulatory tool in Mexico (Estache et al., 2002), Portugal (Barros, 2003a) and Italy (Ferrari and Basta, 2009)

# Technical Efficiency Model – Slacks Based Measure of Efficiency (SBM) (Tone, 2001)

$$\text{Min}_{\lambda, s^-, s^+} \rho = \frac{\left(1 - \frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^m \frac{s_i^-}{x_{io}}\right)}{\left(1 + \frac{1}{s} \sum_{r=1}^s \frac{s_r^+}{y_{ro}}\right)}$$

s. t.

$$x_o = X\lambda + s^-$$

$$y_o = Y\lambda - s^+$$

$$e\lambda = 1$$

$$\lambda \geq 0, s^- \geq 0, s^+ \geq 0$$

$\rho \rightarrow$  Technical efficiency score,  $(0 < \rho \leq 1)$

$X \rightarrow$  Input matrix

$Y \rightarrow$  Output matrix

$e \rightarrow$  A vector with all elements equal to 1

$\lambda \rightarrow$  A non-negative vector of weights

$x_o \rightarrow$  Input vector of DMU  $o$

$y_o \rightarrow$  Output vector of DMU  $o$

$s^- \rightarrow$  Input excess

$s^+ \rightarrow$  Output shortfall

$m \rightarrow$  Number of inputs

$s \rightarrow$  Number of outputs

$x_{io} \rightarrow$  Input  $i$  of DMU  $o$

$y_{ro} \rightarrow$  Output  $r$  of DMU  $o$

$s_i^- \rightarrow$  Excess in input  $i$

$s_r^+ \rightarrow$  Shortfall in output  $r$

# Data for SBM of Technical Efficiency


	Factor	Description	Unit	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Inputs	Capital	Depreciation of the port authority's assets plus the finance and miscellaneous expenditure	Rs. Crore*	95	84	9	398
	Variable Costs	Operating expenditure minus the depreciation of the port authority's assets minus the expenses on salaries and wages	Rs. Crore*	91	76	5.4	405
	Labour	Number of non-cargo handling officers and workers	Count	4,039	3,783	686	20,019
Outputs	Vessels	Total number of vessels handled	Count	1,668	748	414	3,681
	Cargo	Total volume of cargo handled	Million Tonnes	36	19	6.9	100
	Quality of Service	Reciprocal of the average turnaround time	Days <sup>-1</sup>	0.27	0.11	0.067	0.63

Observations: 230

\* All monetary measures are in crores of Rupees, which have been adjusted with the wholesale price index (WPI) with FY96 as the base year in order to account for inflation

All data gathered from the annual publication of the Indian Ports Association

# General Trends





# Inputs and Outputs

Model	Inputs	Outputs
A	Capital	Vessels
	Variable Costs	Cargo
	Labour	Quality of Service
B	Capital	Vessels
	Variable Costs	Cargo
	Labour	

# Seaport Fixed Effects Regression

- $Eff_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_1 Spec_{it} + \beta_2 O_{it} + \beta_3 CompState_{it} + \beta_4 CompCoa_{it} + \beta_5 CompOppCoa_{it} + \beta_6 Reg_t + \beta_7 Time_t + \mu_i + \epsilon_{it}$
- $Eff_{it} \rightarrow$  Technical efficiency of seaport  $i$  at time  $t$
- $\beta_1$  to  $\beta_7 \rightarrow$  Coefficients of the independent variables that are estimated in the model
- $Spec_{it} \rightarrow$  Keeble Hauser HHI of seaport  $i$  at time  $t$
- $O_{it} \rightarrow$  External stakeholder participation in seaport  $i$  at time  $t$
- $CompState_{it} \rightarrow$  Competition within state for seaport  $i$  at time  $t$
- $CompCoa_{it} \rightarrow$  Competition along coast for seaport  $i$  at time  $t$
- $CompOppCoa_{it} \rightarrow$  Competition from opposite coast for seaport  $i$  at time  $t$
- $Reg_t \rightarrow$  TAMP regulatory guidelines introduced at time  $t$
- $Time_t \rightarrow$  Annual time period dummy for time  $t$
- $\alpha_i \rightarrow$  Time invariant intercept for seaport  $i$
- $\mu_i \rightarrow$  Time invariant error component of seaport  $i$
- $\epsilon_{it} \rightarrow$  Idiosyncratic error term of seaport  $i$  in time period  $t$


# Variables for Second Stage Regression Models

- $Eff_{it}$ - Derived from the first stage VRS SBM of TE
- $Spec_{it}$ 
  - $Spec_{it} = \sqrt{\sum_{k=1}^4 (s_i^k)^2}$
  - $s_i^k = \frac{x_i^k}{\sum_{k=1}^4 x_i^k}$
  - x represents the cargo handled in a port within each of four types k and k is divided into dry bulk, liquid bulk, break-bulk and container cargo
- $O_{it}$ - Three levels of external stakeholder participation at the level of the berth
  - Between 0 and 33%
  - Between 33 and 66%
  - Above 66%
- $Comp_{it}$ 
  - $Comp_i = \sum_{j=1}^{n-i-c} \frac{CarHan_j}{d_{ij}}$
  - $Comp_{it}$  calculated within state, along coast and from opposite coast
  - Measures normalized by the standard deviation of the sample
- $Reg_t$ - Seven levels with the date of publishing of a certain set of TAMP guidelines
  - Internal regulation
  - 1998
  - 2003
  - 2005
  - 2008
  - 2013
  - 2015

# Data for Second Stage Regression Models


Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	Regulation	Number of Observations	Ownership	Number of Observations
Specialization	0.74	0.11	0.54	0.96	Internal Regulation TAMP 1998 Modified TAMP 1998 TAMP 2005 TAMP 2008 TAMP 2013 TAMP 2015	30	0 to 33%	161
Competition within State	0.46	1	0	5.51				
Competition Along Coast	0.75	1	0	4.47		48	33 to 66%	53
Competition from Opposite Coast	0.69	1	0	3.77		22	Above 66%	4
						32		
						54		
						22		
						10		

# SBM of Technical Efficiency




# Average Yearly SBM of Technical Efficiency

Model A



Model B



# Seaports Fixed Effects Regression Results

	Dependent Variable	
	Efficiency Model A	Efficiency Model B
Specialization	<b>0.731**</b>	<b>0.934***</b>
	(0.305)	(0.250)
Ext. Ownership 0 to 33%	<b>Base Case</b>	
Ext. Ownership 33 to 66%	<b>0.228***</b>	0.081
	(0.073)	(0.059)
Ext. Ownership Above 66%	<b>0.334***</b>	0.171*
	(0.114)	(0.093)
Competition State	<b>-0.052***</b>	<b>-0.048***</b>
	(0.020)	(0.016)
Competition Coast	<b>-0.101**</b>	<b>-0.081**</b>
	(0.041)	(0.033)
Competition Opposite Coast	-0.050	-0.012
	(0.031)	(0.025)


	Dependent Variable	
	Efficiency Model A	Efficiency Model B
Internal Regulation	<b>-0.145**</b>	-0.100*
	(0.073)	(0.060)
TAMP 1998	<b>-0.189***</b>	<b>-0.141**</b>
	(0.071)	(0.058)
Modified TAMP 1998	<b>Base Case</b>	
TAMP 2005	<b>0.222***</b>	<b>0.228***</b>
	(0.071)	(0.058)
TAMP 2008	<b>0.270***</b>	<b>0.242***</b>
	(0.090)	(0.073)
TAMP 2013	<b>0.449***</b>	<b>0.351***</b>
	(0.110)	(0.090)
TAMP 2015	<b>0.495***</b>	<b>0.433***</b>
	(0.112)	(0.091)
Observations	217	218
R <sup>2</sup>	0.506	0.555
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.407	0.466
F Statistic	7.082*** (df = 26; 180)	8.683*** (df = 26; 181)
Note	* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01	

# Conclusion

- Gradual increase in efficiency of the seaports from around 40 % to around 70% over the time duration considered
- Specialization has a significant positive impact on performance
- External stakeholder participation have significant positive performance impacts only when the quality of service is included as an output in the DEA
- Competition from state ports have significant negative performance impacts within the state and along the coast
- Cost based regulation by a partly independent regulator is more performance inducing than when the ports are internally regulated
- Regulation of competition for the market has had positive performance impacts
- The upfront tariff fixation policy has had positive impacts on performance
- Wholesale price indexing of tariffs and the inclusion of performance compliance terms for tariff escalations have significant positive impacts on performance




**Vielen Dank!**



**Figure 1: Prominent Ports in India (A Snapshot for financial year 2015-2016)**  
**Data Source: Major Ports of India. A Profile: 2015-2016; Indian Ports Association (2017)**  
 Map made using ggmap and ggplot2 packages in R (Kahle and Wickham; 2013)

# Annual Seaport Efficiency Scores



# Time Effects

	Dependent Variable	
	Efficiency Model A	Efficiency Model B
FY96	0.076 (0.070)	0.114** (0.057)
FY97	-0.027 (0.072)	0.004 (0.059)
FY99	-0.010 (0.069)	0.003 (0.056)
FY01	-0.022 (0.070)	-0.022 (0.057)
FY02	0.018 (0.068)	0.029 (0.056)
FY03	0.070 (0.088)	0.025 (0.072)
FY04	0.026 (0.068)	0.001 (0.056)
FY06	-0.106 (0.071)	-0.124** (0.058)
FY07	-0.091 (0.070)	-0.100* (0.057)
FY09	-0.066 (0.083)	-0.066 (0.068)
FY10	-0.066 (0.073)	0.017 (0.060)
FY11	0.033 (0.069)	0.103* (0.057)
FY12	0.011 (0.068)	0.029 (0.056)
FY14	-0.165** (0.071)	-0.105* (0.057)

# SEAPORT DEA PAPERS REVIEWED

- Barros, C.P. (2003(b)) The measurement of efficiency of Portuguese sea port authorities with DEA, *International Journal of Transport Economics*, **30** (3) 335-354.
- Barros, C.P., Athanassiou, M. (2004) Efficiency in European Seaports with DEA: Evidence from Greece and Portugal, *Maritime Economics and Logistics*, **6** 122-140.
- Cullinane, K., Ping, J., Wang, T. (2005(a)) The relationship between privatization and DEA estimates of efficiency in the container port industry, *Journal of Economics and Business*, **57** 433-462.
- Cullinane, K., Ping, J., Wang, T. (2005(b)) The Application of Mathematical Programming Approaches to Estimating Container Port Production Efficiency, *Journal of Productivity Analysis*, **24** 73-92.
- Cullinane, K., Song, D-W., Ji, P., Wang, T-F. (2004) An Application of DEA Windows Analysis to Container Port Production Efficiency, *Review of Network Economics*, **3** (2) 184-206.
- Cullinane, K., Wang, T-F., Song, D-W., Ji, P. (2006) The technical efficiency of container ports: Comparing data envelopment analysis and stochastic frontier analysis, *Transportation Research Part A*, **40** 354-374.
- Estache, A., Tovar de la Fe, B., Trujillo, L. (2004) Sources of efficiency gains in port reform: a DEA decomposition of a Malmquist TFP index for Mexico, *Utilities Policy*, **12** 221-230.
- Itoh, H. (2002) Efficiency Changes at Major Container Ports in Japan: A Window Application of Data Envelopment Analysis, *Review of Urban and Regional Development Studies*, **14** (2) 133-152
- Martinez-Budria, E., Diaz-Armas, R., Navarro-Ibanez, M., Ravelo-Mesa, T. (1999) A study of the efficiency of Spanish port authorities using data envelopment analysis, *International Journal of Transport Economics*, **26** (2) 237-253.
- Park, R-K., De, P. (2004) An Alternative Approach to Efficiency Measurement of Seaports, *Maritime Economics and Logistics*, **6** 53-69.
- Roll, Y., Hayuth, Y. (1993) Port performance comparison applying data envelopment analysis (DEA), *Maritime Policy & Management: The flagship journal of international shipping and port research*, **20** (2) 153-161.
- Tongzon, J. (2001) Efficiency measurement of selected Australian and other international ports using data envelopment analysis, *Transportation Research Part A*, **35** 107-122.
- Turner, H., Windle, R., Dresner, M. (2004) North American containerport productivity: 1984–1997, *Transportation Research Part E*, **40** 339-356.
- Wang, T-F., Cullinane, K. (2006) The Efficiency of European Container Terminals and Implications for Supply Chain Management, *Maritime Economics and Logistics*, **8** 82-99.